MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES
CHuES E. JOHNSON*

An informed observer of corporate reporting in this country during the last
twenty-five years must inevitably conclude that substantial progress is evident in both
the quantity and quality of information flowing from the management of publicly
held corporations to outsiders. Management has no doubt responded to pressures
from regulatory agencies and from an increasingly sophisticated and more broadly
based investing public. But managers also have learned that paying heed to their
social responsibility for providing information about their companies is likely to be
in their own long-range self-interest.'
Published reports, in which the major corporate attributes of income, fund flows,
and financial position are measured, constitute the main picture windows through
which outsiders get a view of what is going on in private corporations. But the scope
of the total corporate reporting function is broader than this. Much financial data
not contained in the annual report reaches individual investors indirectly through
the network of investment advisory and statistical services. Prospectuses, stock
exchange listing applications, and Securities and Exchange Commission registration
statements and annual and other reports are all combed and digested by the major
financial services. Accounting and related information having a limited initial circulation thus filters into the hands of the public.

THE

QUALITY OF ACCOUNTING DATA

Prior to World War II the quantity of accounting data made available by corporations was a matter of concern. There is still room for improvement in this area, but
this problem is now of secondary importance. A major concern of accountants and
investors today is the quality-the economic relevance and intercompany comparability-of accounting information.
The main source of the qualitative problem is clear: the measurement of net
income and financial position is a highly imperfect process. Accounting measures
are inherently imprecise largely because the primary measurement problem is to
scale future prospects into a system of future values and then determine their present
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significance. Unfortunately the crystal balls in accountants' offices and managerial
boardrooms are no better than those in the soothsayer's parlor. Theorists who have
studied the accountant's measurement problem usually wind up by concluding that
the task of measuring corporate income and position objectively is an impossible
assignment. 2 So long as men regard as useful the struggle to provide even rough
approximations, however, we are saddled with the financial measurement problem.
We need to be continually reminded of the pitfalls to insure that we remain humble
in the face of the odds against us.
Finding it essentially impossible to measure what we would like to know about
corporations, accountants approached the problem by substituting something they
could measure in the hope that this information would at least throw some light
on the situation. The term accounting principles took root and flourished as a
collective title for the assumptions, concepts, procedures, rules, and conventions
employed in the measurement system that evolved as a basis for financial statements.
Although the word principlesis still widely used in this conglomerate sense, accountants have become more sophisticated in recent years and have identified three conceptual levels of the framework of accounting: (i) basic postulates of accounting,

which are the assumptions underlying the measurement process; (2) broad principles, which stem from basic postulates, and (3) rules for the application of principles
in specific situations. Admittedly, this terminological precision has not yet been
widely adopted in practice, but it has received substantial authoritative supports
As might be expected there is far greater accord with respect to the basic postulates

of accounting than with respect to its principles and rules. It is always easier to agree
on broad general objectives than on the best means of accomplishing these objectives.
If accounting principles and rules-like driving on the right side of the road-were
purely conventional in nature, the qualitative problem would be less difficult. In the
important areas of accounting, however, reason and judgment govern the measurement process. Moreover, there is considerable latitude for differences of opinion
as to the best way, or even the acceptable ways, to measure the result of given
economic events. Accounting is a man-made art, not a science; it does not enjoy

the discipline of natural laws.
II
TuHE SouRcEs oF NONCOMPARABILITY oF FINANCIAL DATA
Accountants have long been aware of the nature of their measurement affliction.
Financial statements for two companies having identical asset and debt positions and

engaging in an identical set of transactions during a given period may differ sig2 See, e.g., W. J. VATTER, THE FuND THEORY OF ACCOUNTING (1947); Alexander, Income Measurement in a Dynamic Economy, in STumiEs IN AcCOuTTING THEORY 126 (Baxter & Davidson, 2d ed. 1962).
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nificantly even though each statement is prepared in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles. One who seeks the reason for this apparent inconsistency will find two major explanations:
(I) Uniform accounting measurement procedures may produce different results
when applied to transactions that are equivalent in economic reality but different in
timing and form. For example, suppose that Firm A and Firm B operate two plants
identical in age and operating conditions. Firm A acquired its plant new ten years
ago at a price of ten million dollars and has depreciated it to a book value of six
million dollars at the beginning of the current year. Firm B acquired its plant
recently by buying a ten-year-old facility from Firm C for nine million dollars.
Following an identical accounting principle of measuring assets at acquisition cost
less the estimated cost of expired asset services, Firm A will value its plant at six
million dollars, and Firm B will value its plant at nine million dollars. Differences
in asset valuation will also produce material differences in depreciation expense
charged in arriving at net income for subsequent periods. The variation in the
timing of the two plant acquisitions, coupled with changes in construction costs,
combine to produce different accounting results under the same measurement principle. Narrowing the range of alternative generally accepted accounting principles
will not necessarily obviate this source of noncomparabiity in financial data.
(2) Different accounting principles, each generally accepted, may produce materially different measures of position and income. To illustrate, 'suppose that Firm
C and Firm D own identical plants acquired at the same price and the same time.
Firm C adopts straight line depreciation; Firm D depreciates its plant by using one
of the accepted accelerated methods, which results in heavier depreciation in early
years of service life. In this case differences in accounting methods adopted by each
firm will produce significantly different net income figures and asset values.
One could provide numerous additional examples in each category, but these
should suffice to make the point. The source of the noncomparability of reported
financial data is more complex than simply the existence of alternative accounting
principles. At some risk of oversimplification we may observe that attack on the first
source of noncomparability depends largely on changes in the basic postulates underlying the accounting process and perhaps on improvements in our measuring techniques. Attack on the second source of noncomparability depends on narrowing the
range of alternative accounting principles and procedures that are given the seal of
general acceptance.
III

THE ROLE oip rH

ACCOUNTING PROFESSION

The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has officially recognized
its responsibility for assuming leadership in improving the art of accounting in both
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of the areas discussed above. The following statement by its Committee on Research
was officially approved by the governing Council of the AICPA:
The general purpose of the Institute in the field of financial accounting should be
to advance the written expression of what constitutes generally accepted accounting
principles for the guidance of its members and others. This means something more
than a survey of existing practice. It means continuing effort to determine appropriate practice and to narrow the areas of difference and inconsistency in practice....
Also, the Institute should encourage cooperative study with other representative
groups to determine that its understanding and interpretation of (accounting) postulates are valid and to provide a forum which will command sufficient respect to
bring about a change in postulates when any of them become outmoded. 4
In response to this charge the AICPA recently sponsored two notable research
studies that attempted to deal with the problem in these terms.5 Since the conclusions
of neither study have received the official blessing of the AICPA, it is perhaps too
early to assess the influence of this research effort on accounting practice. The logic
and firm theoretical foundation provided by these studies, however, is a base from
which progress may be made in future years, both in improving the assumptions
that govern accounting measurement and in narrowing the range of acceptable
alternative principles and rules.

IV
MANAGEMENT'S ROLE

Any attempt to narrow the range of acceptable accounting principles used in
corporate reporting should take into account management's role in shaping accounting
measurements, because managers are initially and primarily responsible for the information contained in corporate reports. The basic assumption that management
is responsible for the contents of financial statements has a long tradition and is
deeply rooted in the mores of the accounting profession. It is described by the
AICPA's Committee on Auditing Procedures as follows:
Management has the responsibility for adopting sound accounting policies, for
maintaining an adequate and effective system of accounting for the safeguarding of
assets, and for devising a system of internal control that will, among other things,
help assure the production of proper financial statements.... [T]he fairness of the
representations made through financial statements is an implicit and integral part
of management's responsibility.... His [the independent auditor's] responsibility
for the statements he has examined is confined to the expression of his opinion
on them. The financial statements remain the representations of management.0
'GrDY, op. cit. supra note 3, at x.
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The combination of private and social responsibility inherent in the publicly held
corporation requires that managers function as trustees of economic resources, accountable to stockholders, employees, customers, creditors, government agencies, and the
public in general. Corporate stewardship, however, is concerned not with the
conservation of resources but with growth through engaging in profitable endeavors.
Thus the information contained in financial statements constitutes not only an
accounting for fiduciary responsibility, but more importantly is a measure of management's performance. In a very real sense, accounting statements are an index
of managerial success and thus a report on management.
Because corporate managers, and the various outside interests to which they are
accountable, have important and sometimes conflicting interests in the current status
and progress of corporations, a number of forces are at work trying to influence
management to shape accounting measurements to particular ends. Let us examine
some of these pressures.
A. Reflection on Managerial Performance
The most obvious pressure, though not necessarily the most influential, is management's interest in having a favorable performance report. Accounting statements
are a major element of the scorekeeping process that attests to managerial success or
failure and reveals the current standings of corporations in economic competition,
reflecting glory (or ignominy) on the managerial stars of the team. Apart from
managerial status, the compensation of corporate managers is strongly influenced by
earnings reports, particularly when stock options are an important element in the
compensation structure.
Managers would scarcely be human if they did not pay some attention to the
scoreboard in setting accounting policy. To the extent that this kind of bias is
operative against conflicting pressures, it favors accounting methods that will increase
short-run earnings. Management may resist proposals to adopt the LIFO inventory
method, for example, because of a short-run adverse effect on reported profits.
Arthur Wyatt, in a study of corporate combinations, concludes that the managerial
predilection toward the pooling-of-interests approach in accounting for mergers
and consolidations stems largely from a desire to avoid the consequences of amortizing increased asset values and thus depressing reported earnings after the combination.7
B. Tax Implications of Particular Accounting Methods
Without question the most forceful pressure influencing the choice of accounting
methods is the Internal Revenue Code. Income taxation, if not the mother of
accounting understatement, is certainly a doting godfather. The ghost of the obvious
7
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tax advantages that stem from an understatement of assets and income sits at the
shoulder of management whenever accounting policies are at issue. For example,
base stock and LIFO inventory accounting methods were proposed in the accounting
literature for a variety of alleged nontax reasons, but their use languished until the
194os when LIFO gained income tax acceptance. A similar effect is evident in the
choice of depreciation methods. The allowance of more liberal accelerated depreciation methods in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 acted as a strong encouragement
to the adoption of these methods for accounting purposes. Accounting for exploration and development expenditures in extractive industries is strongly influenced by
the option to charge these expenditures to current expense for tax purposes. Tax
factors play a major role in keeping goodwill, lease rights, and other intangibles off
the financial statements even in cases where there is reasonably objective evidence of
their existence and value.
The Internal Revenue Code provides that "taxable income shall be computed
under the method of accounting on the basis of which the taxpayer regularly computes his income in keeping his books."' There is also a specific requirement that
LIFO adopted for tax purposes must also be used in published accounting statementsP A growing number of accountants and managers argue, however, that
taxable income and accounting income are two different concepts and that divergence
between the two is not only to be expected but to be encouraged. It is managements
responsibility to adopt for tax purposes accounting methods which will legally
minimize the present value of future income tax liabilities. This objective, however,
is not pertinent in the choice among accounting principles for reporting on corporate
performance. Fortunately for this view, those who administer the tax law (with the
exception of the LIFO provision cited above) have not made use in corporate
reporting a necessary condition for the adoption of any given authorized accounting
method for tax purposes.
The growing divergence between taxable income and reported income is evidenced
by the tax allocation controversy. Tax allocation is an accounting procedure designed
to make provision in the accounts, as both a charge to expense and a liability, for
estimated future income taxes on income reported currently in financial statements
but not subject to inclusion in taxable income until later years. Logically the procedure is also applicable but not widely used in the opposite case; that is, when
income is currently taxed but not reported in financial statements until later
years. The admission of tax allocation to the list of generally accepted accounting
principles suggests that differences between taxable income and reported income
exist and are significant.
There is an obvious conflict between managements inclination toward favorable
performance reports and the desire to understate and postpone the recognition of in8INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 446(a).
' INT.

REV.
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come for tax purposes. This pressure is reinforced by the fact that the choice of one
accounting approach for reporting and another for tax purposes imposes on management a considerable burden of proof in arguments with Internal Revenue agents about
the justification for its tax accounting. The general inability to amortize goodwill for
tax purposes is a strong deterrent to its appearance on the balance sheet. Management is strongly motivated to assign maximum values to depreciable property rights
in joint acquisitions because a different assignment for reporting purposes would
jeopardize the tax treatment.
If the view that taxable income and accounting income are two different things
were widely accepted, corporate managers would in effect be able to have their tax
cake and enjoy its eating in the pages of their financial reports. Nevertheless, the
trend toward recognizing the different objectives of corporate reporting and income
tax administration may be an important factor in improving accounting reports, since
it provides an escape hatch from tax pressures that operate against a fair reporting
of corporate performance. It is unrealistic to assume, however, that tax pressures on
corporate reporting will ever become insignificant.
C. Effect on Stock Prices
A third factor influencing corporate accounting policy is pressure from stockholders and potential investors to report results that will favorably affect stock prices.
This pressure reinforces management's own self-interest in favorable earnings and
position reports. Management may resist a change in accounting policy because
they are unwilling to face stockholder reaction to the resulting unfavorable effect on
reported income.
Since stockholders like higher earnings per share there is often a conflict between
investor pressure and income tax pressures on accounting policies. The conflict is
well illustrated by the following quotation from a recent issue of a business publication:
A debate on accounting methods is going on within the paper industry. West
Virginia Pulp and Paper is switching from accelerated to straight line depreciation
write-offs in fiscal 1965. This will lower depreciation charges and boost profits by
some 6o per share. Though most paper companies have switched to the straight
line method, International Paper and St. Regis Paper are notable holdouts. Inter-

national says that having fought for faster write-offs, it is obliged to show them in
annual reports. St. Regis has been pressured by stockbrokers to switch. Analysts

say the change could mean an extra 4o0 a share in 1964.10
It is clear that management, in wrestling with the choice of accounting methods
under these circumstances, will find it difficult to concentrate on the important issue:
which method results in a fairer presentation of income and financial position as
measures of corporate performance?
10 Business

Week, Dec. I9, 1964, p. O8.
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D. Public and Labor Relations
Financial statements are an important part of management's case in debates over

corporate policy in the arena of public opinion. The kind of income figures that
emerge during important labor negotiations are a matter about which managers
are understandably sensitive. Here the desire to spray performance reports with

the fragrance of prosperity and success is in sharp conflict with the inclination to
approach labor negotiations with an air of abject poverty. This conflict leads to
attempts to argue that corporate performance is not as favorable as financial reports
suggest because of rising price levels and replacement costs. The argument over
the effect of changes in price levels and specific prices on accounting measurements
has engaged accounting theorists for over a century, with no generally accepted
solution yet in sight. In the 193os, labor used falling replacement costs to support
its case that companies were better off than accounting reports suggested, while
management extolled the virtues of original investment. In the 195os, their positions
and arguments were for the most part reversed in the face of rising prices.
President Kennedy's entrance into the steel pricing issue in 1962 provided dramatic
evidence that prices charged for products in major nonregulated industries may be
influenced by accounting reports. An increase in the price of steel today may depend
less on the economic ability of the steel companies to sell their product at a higher
price than on their ability to convince the public that a price increase is justified in
maintaining a proper balance of equity among the various segments of our society
having an interest in the steel industry.
E. Internal Accounting Needs
A fifth pressure on, accounting principles is the internal uses of accounting information. The accounting system of any firm is a major element in the general
information system that provides data to managerent as a basis for decision making.
Marginal and differential costs, for example, are often relevant to management's
decisions, and progressive managers will find it useful to have these kinds of
measurements incorporated in the general reporting system. The direct-costing controversy stems from this factor. The decision-making advantages of marginal inventory costing are well recognized by managerial accountants, but the effect on
position and earnings is, in the minds of the public accounting profession, in conflict
with the objectives of periodical performance reporting. On the other hand, the
need for objectivity in published measurements keeps out of corporate reports information generated internally for managerial purposes that outsiders might find
extremely useful. In making investment decisions, management often develops data
in detailed capital budgeting analyses that are relevant to the accountant's valuation
problem. 1 The accountant's objectivity requirement at present constitutes a strong
11 For examples see Davidson, The Day of Reckoning-Managerial and Accounting Theory, i J.
AccOUNTING RESEARCH 117 (1963).
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bar against the incorporation of this kind of data in financial statements, although
management may circulate such information informally.
F. Conclusions on Influences Affecting Management
The biases reflected in these five kinds of pressure on management to mould
accounting reports in particular ways do not, of course, operate in one direction.
In making accounting policy decisions, management must often feel a strong kinship
with the employee who approaches his boss for a raise and tries to appear povertystricken and unusually competent at one and the same time.
Recent testimony of a senior partner of a. prominent accounting firm has been
quoted frequently as evidence that the net directional bias of management is toward
overstatement of earnings. Mr. Spacek observed that in ninety-nine out of ioo arguments over alternative accounting methods the accountant is "arguing for a procedure
' 12
that would show a lower profit than the procedure the client wants to follow.
In interpreting this statement, however, one must remember that the independent
accountant himself has a strong bias that he carries around in a little bag labeled
"the principle of conservatism."' 3 Independent public accountants have a much
higher tolerance for understatement than overstatement, and one suspects that Mr.
Spacek's firm simply did not raise any serious objections over accounting methods in
another ninety-nine cases where substantial understatement was present in financial
reports.
Where obvious bias and conflicting pressures are present, it is not reasonable
to assume that some natural law of countervailing forces will operate to keep the
measurement process on an objective course. The inherent weakness of a situation
in which the choice among alternative accounting principles and methods lies for
the most part in the hands of the group whose performance is judged by the resulting
financial statements is an important consideration in the current controversy over
the need for greater uniformity in accounting measurements.
V
MANAGERIAL INFLUENCE ON ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES

There is nothing particularly sinister in the fact that outside pressures and selfinterest create a managerial bias in setting accounting policies. Bias is a ubiquitous
human characteristic and thus an important social phenomenon. We customarily
institute checks and balances in our public and private institutions to provide a
framework within which bias and conflicting social pressure can work effectively.
The managers and players in professional sports, for example, have a considerable
" Spacek, The Need for an Accounting Court, 33 ACCOUNTING REV. 368, 371 (1958).
" Most authorities deny that conservatism is a principle of accounting, or at least define it in such a
way that it loses status as a principle. For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Devine, The Rule of
Conservatism Reexamined, x J. ACCOUNTING REsEARCH 127 (1963).
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personal and financial stake in the scoring process by which their performance is
judged. In accordance with the best principles of countervailing power, we incorporate into the game a retinue of timers, scorekeepers, umpires, and field judges
who make the measurements and report on the performance statistics and the outcome of the contest.
Our scoring system in the case of publicly held corporations is in striking contrast.
Management is allowed to set accounting policy and to make accounting measurements. When the results are compiled management then hires an umpire, the
professional accountant, who reviews the measurement process and renders an
opinion on the fairness and consistency of the reported results.
The umpire in this situation limits himself to expressing an opinion on managerial representations and perhaps amplifying or qualifying his opinion with explanations, additional disclosures, or expressions of disapproval as he deems appropriate. The sole source of the CPA's influence on the measurement process is'his
persuasive ability, backed by his ultimate right to withhold his opinion. Not only
is arguing with the umpire permitted, but management has a far greater chance
of influencing the auditor's decision than we would tolerate in any sports contest.
Management's ultimate control over accounting measurements has a number of
sources. The first is that the rulebook of accounting measurements, titled Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles, has never been officially codified. This in itself
allows management and the auditor a wide latitude in deciding on the principles
that are acceptable as a fair representation of corporate performance. Statements
having the weight of authority, such as the SEC's Accounting Series Releases, the
AICPA's Accounting Research Bulletins, and the Opinions of the Accounting
Principles Board came into being largely in response to fire alarms, as the importunate and clarion calls for rulings were heard in the central station. Various
comprehensive attempts to state the generally accepted principles of accounting have
only unofficial status. The most recent attempt by Paul Grady is frankly called an
inventory14 and is essentially an organized compilation of past statements by various
authorities plus a description of methods extant in current practice.
The second reason for management's control over the selection of accounting
principles is more fundamental. Even if there were an official restatement of generally accepted principles as they are understood today, we would still be far from
the uniformity of reporting standards necessary to achieve anything like the comparability we seek. A wide variety of alternative measurement methods, allowing
for material variations in reported results, exists even in areas covered by official
pronouncements. Why does the accounting profession tolerate this kind of variety?
Accountants in general are reluctant to accept collective judgment that would
narrowly prescribe acceptable measurement procedures. They believe such a move
would mean giving up their freedom to exercise professional judgment and would
14
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reduce their function to that of a clerk. Furthermore, accountants argue that there
are significant differences in the circumstances within which different companies
operate that justify the use of different accounting procedures. Finally, there
is faith in the values of experimentation. Where alternative approaches exist without a clear indication that one method is superior, accountants appear to have
implicit faith that there is some yet undiscovered measurement principle that will
resolve the difference of opinion. The solution is to allow experimentation with
alternative methods until this principle is discovered, at which time everyone will
recognize its undeniable merit and uniformity will be achieved without the necessity of an enforced compliance.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has the power to state, and require
adherence to, specific accounting procedures,'" but it has not exercised this authority
to any significant extent. Instead the SEC has relied upon and supported the
accounting profession in its attempts to place lighthouses at the most pressing danger
spots in the sea of accounting principles.
A third aspect of managerial influence over accounting measurements is related
to the first two. The lack of unequivocal criteria for judging the merits of varying
accounting policies undoubtedly weakens the CPA's ability to exercise what authority
he has. But that authority is itself considerably weakened by the fact that the
CPA is hired and paid by the corporation on whose statements he renders an
opinion. It is true that some corporate charters require the election of public
accountants by stockholders, but the force of this requirement is extremely doubtful.
Except in unusual cases, stockholders ratify management's choice of auditors as a
routine matter.
The upshot of all this is that where alternative accounting procedures are available
and can be rationalized as "generally accepted" it is management that makes the
choice. This is the major implication of management's primary responsibility for
financial reports. The accountant who has strong convictions that alternative
procedures would result in a better presentation of position and operating results can,
according to Spacek, "swallow his convictions, or he can qualify his opinion on the
basis of his own convictions, or he can resign. Usually the latter two courses are one
and the same.' 6 Management's power to choose the umpire strongly suggests that,
if one umpire's decision does not please, another may be found who can honestly
agree that an alternative accounting method is generally acceptable, in some sense of
that term.
The essential problem in management's present role in corporate reporting of
accounting measurements is clear. We have two important elements conducive to
a reporting bias: a conflict of interest and the ability to influence results in terms of
self-interest. The problem appears sufficiently serious to warrant some attention.
"5 Securities Act of I933, § x9(a), 48 Star. 85, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (x964).
16 Spacek, supra note 12, at 371.
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VI
CHOOSING THE AUDITOR

An important step in any concerted move to narrow the range of accounting
principles and procedures is to give the independent accountant greater authority
over their choice. One possible move toward this objective would be to devise a
different method of selecting independent auditors. If auditors were chosen by
someone other than management, this would strengthen the hand of the CPA
who is called upon to render an opinion on managerial representations. The
principle seems dear, but a practical means of applying it is not so apparent.
Stockholders are logical candidates for such a role. In theory they employ management and have important interests not entirely coincident with those of corporate
managers. If financial reports are statements of managerial performance, and if
management is accountable to stockholders, why not put the choice of the expert
who renders an opinion on management's reports in the stockholders' hands? One
weakness of this suggestion is that it is difficult to devise a scheme to make stockholder selection of auditors effective. We have already noted that, where such a
provision now exists in corporate charters, stockholders routinely ratify management's choice of CPAs. The effectiveness of choice could be strengthened by
requiring management to present two candidates for stockholder selection, but the
question arises whether stockholders as a group are sufficiendy informed to make
an intelligent choice. A more attractive approach would be to put the selection
of the independent CPA in the hands of a committee of stockholders composed of
persons not associated with either management or the board of directors. This stockholders' committee might be elected at the same time as the directors. Under this
arrangement, management should be free to choose a different public accounting
firm for management-services engagements if it desires. This latter separation of
engagements would provide some auxiliary advantages from the viewpoint of the
accounting profession in its serious attempts to retain audit independence in the
face of a growing demand for management consulting activities.
A possible objection to strengthening the stockholders' role is that publicly held
corporations have growing social responsibilities and stockholders as a group have
their own self-interest and potential biases. On these grounds one might propose
that the selection of auditors for large publicly held corporations be made by a public
body, such as the SEC. In theory, at least, this approach would provide the accountant with the greatest degree of independence from pressures by management and
stockholders. The thought of having a quasi-political body choose professional
firms to perform engagements for which substantial fees are to be paid, however, is
not very attractive. Assuming the corporation would continue to pay the audit fee,
this opens up the whole difficult business of judging whether a fee is reasonable when
the employer and the payer are two different parties. The suggestion that standard
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fees be set by a governmental body for professional engagements in which advice is
rendered to a nameless public falls in the category of cures that are likely to be
worse than the disease. On principle, any arrangement that divorces the hiring and
compensating of professional firms from the most direct beneficiary of the services is
difficult to defend. The basic difficulty in this case is that the ultimate beneficiaries
of good corporate reporting are a number of diverse groups difficult to identify
except in terms of the general investing public.
On balance, the most attractive avenue for modifying our present system of
hiring and paying the CPA is to strengthen the role of the stockholder, particularly
through the use of executive committees composed of relatively well-informed
stockholders who are not a part of management. In this connection it is interesting
to note some developments in this direction in the Scandinavian countries. In a
recent study, Bomeli reports that the most significant difference between American
and Scandinavian practice in this area is the much closer relation of Scandinavian
auditors to shareholders. 17 Any stockholder or group of stockholders owning more
than ten per cent of the outstanding shares may appoint an independent accountant
to consult with auditors designated by management and to report to the appointing
group. Mr. Bomeli does not specify who pays the fee of the stockholder-appointed
auditors, but one may infer from his discussion that the corporation foots the bill.
One additional means of strengthening the CPA's independence of both management and stockholders would be to increase the seriousness of the CPA's withdrawal
from an engagement. A provision for fairly widespread notice of withdrawal might
well tip the scales a bit in favor of the auditor in arguments over accounting policy,
since notice of withdrawal would automatically raise questions that would bring to
light the nature of the controversy. A requirement that the fact of a withdrawal
from an audit engagement be reported immediately to the stock exchange and the
SEC, and noted in the corporation's annual report and in any prospectuses used in
connection with securities offerings, would add force to the independent accountant's
control over accounting policies. The SEC could probably implement a disclosure
requirement along these general lines under current law.
VII
CHANGING MANAGEMENT'S ROLE

Another approach in a program of mitigating management's influence on accoun-

ting principles is to alter the roles of management and the CPA. Perhaps we should
take a hard look at the traditional premise that published financial statements are
managerial representations on which the auditor's opinion is sought. Herbert
Miller, in a recent article, questions the usefulness of this premise.1 8 Miller points
"' Boneli, Management Reviews by Scandinavian Accountants, J. Accountancy, July 1964, p. 33.
"Miller, Audited Statements-Are They Really Management's?, J. Accountancy, Oct. z964, p. 43.
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out that accounting conventions, income tax rules, SEC regulations, and the independent auditor all have some influence on accounting policies. Despite these
restraints, he concludes, management has a significant ability to shape accounting
measurements. Miller then suggests that management's responsibility be limited
to the adoption and maintenance of an adequate accounting system and that the
independent auditor be given greater responsibility for determining the accounting
principles to be followed. This idea is worth examining more closely in relation
to the objective under discussion.
Shifting primary responsibility for accounting policies to the CPA would not
alone, of course, automatically narrow the range of alternative accounting procedures
falling under the shelter of general acceptance. The CPA would have open to him
as many alternatives as has management, unless professional accountants as a group
chose to grant acceptance to a smaller number of alternative methods. The impact
of such a shift in roles on accounting measurements, however, would be significant.
The most important implication of altering the responsibility of the CPA lies in
the area of choosing among available alternative accounting policies. Where alternative accounting procedures exist, we may assume that the CPA would then have the
responsibility for selection, subject to persuasion by management. The burden of
proof, in a sense, would be shifted. The auditor would be expected to have a
preference and to state it rather than simply to review the preferences of management. Having the burden of setting accounting policy should not only strengthen
the CPA's ability to stand firm on his convictions but should also encourage him to
formulate responsible convictions, since he could no longer limit his function to that
of merely passing on the general acceptability of managerial representations.
Furthermore, the authority to choose the measurement technique implies the

responsibility to make the choice on the basis of a judgment as to which accounting
policy results in the best measure of the performance and position of the corpora-

tion. This would require accounting expertise and judgment of a higher order than
the responsibility now imposed upon the profession and would challenge public
accountants as never before to face up to the major objectives lurking behind the
opinion in their certificate that the statement "presents fairly the financial position
of the
- Company and the results of its operations for the period covered in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles."
The goal of absolute uniformity in accounting procedures is probably neither
attainable nor particularly desirable. The argument that significant differences in
economic circumstances justify alternative accounting measuring approaches is not
merely specious. However, there is little assurance in our present system that
choices will actually be made on the basis of real differences in economic circumstances. One may well question whether the choice between inventory pricing
methods or depreciation methods, or between similar alternatives, is ever significantly
influenced by differences in economic circumstances that make one approach more
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appropriate than the other in measuring corporate progress and performance."
Management chooses on the basis of the kind of pressures previously mentioned;
the auditor simply determines whether the method has general acceptance and
finds the road to an unqualified opinion clear if the answer is "yes." If the public
accounting profession really means business in its announced program of spelling
out the different circumstances that call for alternative accounting measurement

approaches and specifying how these circumstances can be identified and the
appropriate tests for determining when one particular measurement method is better
than another, it still faces the problem of enforcement. Granting responsibility to

the CPA for making the initial choice places on his shoulders the burden of defending his selection on these grounds and increases materially the prospect of getting
better financial data.
Some admininstrative problems are involved in the role reversal of management
and CPAs, but they do not appear to be insuperable. There would be strong
advantages in selecting a CPA at the beginning of a fiscal year so he could be
consulted whenever questions of accounting policy arose. Most firms follow this
practice at the present time. It is true that a change of auditors or the appointment
of a CPA near the close of an accounting period might require changes in accounting
policies. However the major areas of differential accounting treatment are not such
that the measurement principle is irrevocable once the system is set in operation.
Asset valuations and cost determinations can be recomputed after the fact, and, while
the difficulties should not be minimized, they are not beyond the powers of the
accounting art.
A more serious question may be whether placing the initiative for accounting
measurements in the hands of the CPA would stifle the development of new (and
hopefully improved) measurement methods. The auditor inevitably stresses those
qualities of information that command universal confidence-objectivity and authenticity. Management, on the other hand, cherishes those qualities that make information useful for internal decision making. One might argue that management
is more strongly motivated to experiment with different kinds of measurements
since they have the incentive to seek new methods of manipulating data to produce
new kinds of information they find desirable for one reason or another. Whether
the net results are good or bad, there is little question that managerial accountants
have initiated a great deal of accounting experimentation.
One can only speculate as to the CPA's receptiveness to new ideas under the
alteration of roles we are considering. The CPA, his reputation at stake, is likely
to be more cautious and less willing to put his stamp of approval on a new measuring
approach until it has passed the screening of substantial accounting authority. The
" A recent study of managerial decisions on depreciation policy is pertinent. See Lindhc, 4ceelerated
Depreciation for Income Tax Purposes-A Study of the Decision and Some Firms Who Made It, I J.
AccOUNTING REEAIcH 139 (1963).
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pressures to adopt new accounting methods and procedures would not disappear, but
they would be shifted from management to the independent public accountant.
Furthermore, the CPA's criteria for adoption would be more stringent than simple
general acceptability, since he would then face the burden of choosing the most
appropriate measure of corporate performance.
If managers retained the power to select auditors they would still be in a position
to exert pressure if they disapproved of the auditor's choice of accounting policies.
Management, for example, might well investigate the convictions of various CPA
firms on particular accounting policies before appointing an auditing firm. If management had a particular interest in LIFO, or accelerated depreciation, or tax

allocation, or keeping leases off the balance sheet, they could presumably find independent accountants with appropriate convictions on these points. Changing the
responsibility for financial representations is not likely to nullify these sources of
management's influence unless it is reinforced with a system of auditor selection
that is relatively free of managerial influence.

CONCLUSION

In any serious attempt to increase uniformity and intercompany comparability in
corporate reporting we cannot ignore management's role in setting corporate accounting policies. Management is primarily responsible for the choice among alternative
accounting principles used in compiling financial reports. Yet accounting statements
are essentially reports on managerial performance. Apart from the obvious conflict
of interest in such a situation, there is little assurance that management, beset by a
variety of pressures to mould accounting results purposively, uses the best measurement criteria in reaching its accounting policy decisions.
If management's control over corporate accounting policies were restricted, the
independent accountant's ability to narrow the range of accepted alternatives would
be strengthened. More important, where alternative accounting measurement procedures are available, the independent accountant would be encouraged to make
his choice on grounds more consistent with the basic objectives of performance
measurement. Finally, freeing external accounting measurement from strong managerial influence may be an important first step in gaining acceptance for new
accounting principles in which the inevitable compromise between objectivity and
economic relevance is weighted more heavily toward the latter. The challenge to
improve accounting measurements would be thrust directly at the independent
accountant, and hopefully his greater independence of management would give him
the authority to harvest the fruits of his accounting research studies and put them
into practice.

